Fall Of Communism Essay, Research Paper
The shocking fall of communism in Eastern and Central
Europe in the late eighties was remarkable for both its
rapidity and its scope. The specifics of communism’s demise
varied among nations, but similarities in both the causes and
the effects of these revolutions were quite similar. As well, all
of the nations involved shared the common goals of
implementing democratic systems of government and moving
to market economies. In each of these nations, the
communist regimes in power were forced to transfer that
power to radically different institutions than they were
accustomed to. Democracy had been spreading throughout
the world for the preceding two decades, but with a very
important difference. While previous political transitions had
seen similar circumstances, the actual events in question had
generally occurred individually. In Europe, on the other
hand, the shift from communism was taking place in a
different context altogether. The peoples involved were not
looking to affect a narrow set of policy reforms; indeed,
what was at stake was a hyper-radical shift from the
long-held communist ideology to a western blueprint for
governmental and economic policy development. The
problem inherent in this type of monumental change is that,
according to Ulrich K. Preuss, «In almost all the East and
Central European countries, the collapse of authoritarian
communist rule has released national, ethnic, religious and
cultural conflicts which cannot be solved by purely economic
policies» (47). While tremendous changes are evident in both
the governmental and economic arenas in Europe, these
changes cannot be assumed to always be «mutually
reinforcing» (Preuss 47). Generally it has been theorized that
the most successful manner of addressing these many
difficulties is the drafting of a constitution. But what is clear is
the unsatisfactory ability of a constitution to remedy the
problems of nationalism and ethnic differences. Preuss notes
that when the constitutional state gained favor in North
America, it was founded on the principle of the unitary state;
it was not designed to address the lack of national identity
which is found throughout Europe – and which is counter to
the concept of the constitutional state (48). «Measured in
terms of socioeconomic modernization,» writes Helga A.
Welsh, «Central and Eastern European countries had
reached a level that was considered conducive to the
emergence of pluralistic policies» (19). It seemed that the
sole reason the downfall of communism, as it were, took so
long was the veto power of the Soviet Union. According to
theories of modernization, the higher the levels of
socioeconomic achievement, the greater the pressure for
open competition and, ultimately, democracy. As such, the
nations in Eastern and Central Europe were seen as
«anomalies in socioeconomically highly-developed countries
where particularly intellectual power resources have become
widespread» (Welsh 19). Due to their longtime adherence to
communist policies, these nations faced great difficulty in
making the transition to a pluralist system as well as a market
economy. According to Preuss, these problems were
threefold: The genuine economic devastations wrought by
the communist regimes, the transformation of the social and
economic classes of the command economy into the social
and economic classes of a capitalist economy and, finally,
the creation of a constitutional structure for political entities
that lack the undisputed integrity of a nation state (48). With
such problems as these to contend with in re-engineering
their entire economic and political systems, the people of
East Germany seemed to be in a particularly enviable
position. Economically, they were poised to unite with one of
the richest countries, having one of the strongest economies,
in the entire world. In the competition for foreign investment,
such an alliance gave the late German Democratic Republic
a seemingly insurmountable lead over other nations. In
regards to the political aspects of unification, it effectively left
a Germany with no national or ethnic minorities, as well as
having undisputed boundaries. As well, there was no need to
create a constitution (although many of the pitfalls of
constitution-building would have been easily-avoided due to
the advantages Germany had), because the leaders of the
GDR had joined the Federal Republic by accession and,
accordingly, allowed its Basic Law to be extended over their
territory. For all the good that seemed to be imminent as a
result of unification, many problems also arose regarding the
political transformation that Germany was undergoing.
Among these problems were the following: the tensions
between the Basic Law’s simultaneous commitments to
supranational integration and to the German nation state, the
relationship between the nation and the constitution as two
different modes of political integration and the issue of
so-called «backward justice» (Preuss 48). The Federal
Republic of Germany’s Basic Law has been the longest-lived
constitution in Germany’s history. Intended to be a
short-lived, temporary document, the Basic Law gained
legitimacy as West Germany continued to march towards
becoming a major economic power and effective democratic
society. There seemed to be, at first, a tension between the
Basic Law’s explicit support of re-unification and its promise
to transfer sovereignty to a supranational institution that
would be created. The conflict between West Germany’s
goals of national unity and international integration remained
the main issue in the country’s politics for many years. As
Preuss notes, «It will be extremely difficult to escape the
economic and, in the long run also political, implications of
this double-bind situation of Germany, one that remains a
legacy of the postwar order» (51). Since the unification of
Germany was accomplished through accession, it meant,
strangely enough, that neither West nor East Germany had a
say in the other’s decision on whether to form a unified state
or what conditions such a unification would be contingent
upon, respectively. Put simply, the net effect of the extension
of the Basic Law to all of Germany did not guarantee the
implementation of a new joint governing policy or a new
constitution for the country. It seemed, as a result of some
esoteric articles of the Basic Law, that the GDR would
cease to exist legally and the FRG would survive. It was
impossible to draw the conclusion that both would die out
and be replaced by a new political identity. Many of the
Federal Republic’s laws immediately applied in the GDR
(Gloebner 153). Article 146 of the Basic Law, put simply,
allowed for the annulment of the Basic Law, to be replaced
with another governing system, without previously binding
the people to any specific rules. Seemingly, it sanctions
revolution, and, «as proved to be the case in 1990, this is not
a purely theoretical conclusion» (Preuss 52). Some suggest
that, by unifying through accession, Germany has made
problems which could end up overshadowing the benefits of
unification. The suggestion is that the implementation of a
constitution by a society without experience in utilizing it,
without the necessary institutions and without the
corresponding value system will bring about more harm than
good (politically). The imposition of the Basic Law was the
root for much of the mistrust between East and West
Germans following unification. In regards to the East
Germans, the Law was effectively self-imposed, and «neither
submission nor voluntary self-submission is likely to
engender the social and political coherence which is a
necessary condition for a stable democracy» (Preuss 54). In
regards to the economic aspects of unification, some major
problems exist in the transition to democracy and market
economics. According to Preuss, the two main issues
included in the realm of «backward justice» are the
privatization of large pieces of state property, and the
punishment of the elites of the previous regimes and their
comrades under the headings of «self-purification» and
«collective amnesia.» The privatization issue is among the
thorniest involved in any country’s transition from
communism. For one, a system of procedures must be
developed simply to transfer such large amounts of property
to private citizens. Also, there must be mechanisms put in
place to both protect new owners from claims of previous
owners and to satisfy former owners without alienating
possible future investors. The problem boils down to the fact
that private property laws do not always coincide with the
«fair» concept of restitution. As Petra Bauer-Kaase writes,
«East Germans still have difficulties in adjusting to a political
system where individuals have a great deal of responsibility
for their own life» (307). The former East Germans look
upon this issue with contempt, because it is the Westerners
who have control over the rules, as well as the enforcement
of those rules. This is merely one of a multitude of instances
where this mistrust manifests itself. There are also the issues
of self-purification and collective amnesia. Due to the
pervasive nature of the communist regime’s surveillance
programs and so forth, there is very little room for anyone to
claim pure hands. While West Germans can claim that they
are innocent by virtue of geography, East Germans are never
able to escape the suspicions that they may have been part
of the machine. Government jobs are denied to those who
were affiliated with the Stasi, and private businesses also
may deny employment to these citizens. While unification has
occurred theoretically, in reality the Germany today is one of
de facto separate-but-equal citizenship. There is no denying
that there have been many problems associated with the
unification of East and West Germany. The transition from
communist state to liberal democracy is a very difficult one,
and there is no real way to predict how the German
experience will turn out. As Preuss writes, «The transition
from an authoritarian political regime and its concomitant
command economy to a liberal democracy and a capitalist
economy is as unprecedented as the short-term integration
of two extremely different societies – one liberal-capitalist,
one authoritarian-socialist – into one nation state» (57). In
other words, the unification of Germany is one of the most
complicated and unprecedented historical events since the
unification of Germany. Jeremy Waldroop
Bauer-Kaase, Petra. «Germany in Transition: The Challenge
of Coping with Unification.» German Unification: Processes
and Outcomes. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh,
eds. Boulder: Westview, 1994. 285-311. Gloebner,
Gert-Joachim. «Parties and Problems of Governance During
Unification.» German Unification: Processes and Outcomes.
M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds. Boulder:
Westview, 1994. 139-61. Preuss, Ulrich K. «German
Unification: Political and Constitutional Aspects.» United
Germany and the New Europe. Heinz D. Kurz, ed.
Brookfield: Elgar, 1993. 47-58. Welsh, Helga A. «The
Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR:
Evolution, Revolution, and Diffusion.» German Unification:
Processes and Outcomes. M. Donald Hancock and Helga
A. Welsh, eds. Boulder: Westview, 1994. 17-34.