Piracy in Somaly

Report
Piracy in Somalia
Threatening global trade, feeding local wars

INDEX
Summary
Introduction
1.Piracy around Somalia
1.1How the pirates operate
1.2Where the pirates originate
1.3Ransoms
1.4New trends
1.5The international response
Box 1: A victim’sstory
2.Why it matters to the international community
2.1What piracy does to Somalia
2.2What piracy does to international trade
2.3Potential environmental catastrophe
2.4Possible co-opting by international terrorist networks
Box 2: Privatesecurity and Somali piracy
3.Options for the international community
3.1Organize shipping into a safe lane
3.2Provide a coastguard for Somalia
3.3 Alarge naval presence
3.4Pay no ransoms
3.5Do nothing
4.Anti-piracy measures. Military presence
Conclusion
Listof addresses

Summarypoints
· Piracyoff the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 shipshave been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receivingmillion-dollar ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive.
· Theinternational community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates couldbecome agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransomsis helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab.
· Thehigh level of piracy is making aid deliveries to drought-stricken Somalia ever more difficult and costly. The World Food Programme has already been forced totemporarily suspend food deliveries. Canada is now escorting WFP deliveries butthere are no plans in place to replace their escort when it finishes later thisyear.
· Thedanger and cost of piracy (insurance premiums for the Gulf of Aden haveincreased tenfold) mean that shipping could be forced to avoid the Gulf ofAden/Suez Canal and divert around the Cape of Good Hope. This would addconsiderably to the costs of manufactured goods and oil from Asia and the Middle East. At a time of high inflationary pressures, this should be of grave concern.
· Piracycould cause a major environmental disaster in the Gulf of Aden if a tanker issunk or run aground or set on fire. The use of ever more powerful weaponrymakes this increasingly likely.
· Thereare a number of options for the international community but ignoring theproblem is not one of them. It must ensure that WFP deliveries are protectedand that gaps in supply do not occur.

Introduction
Piracy[1] off the coastof Somalia is growing at an alarming rate and threatens to drastically disruptinternational trade. It provides funds that feed the vicious war in Somalia and could potentially become a weapon of international terrorism or a cause ofenvironmental disaster. For long piracy has been a problem mostly associatedwith the Malacca Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia, but it is now a growingissue for fragile African states. Up to 25 September 2008, 61 actual andattempted hijacks had been recorded by the International Chamber of Commerce(ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB). In the last week of August 2008alone four vessels were captured, and the year has seen Somali piracy rise upthe news agenda, propelled by the capture of the Luxury yacht Le Ponant and thekidnap of a German couple who had been sailing their yacht through the Gulf of Aden. Since the end of 2007 piracy activity has shifted away from the Mogadishu port area and into the Gulf of Aden. The actual number of attacks could well behigher: not all incidents will have been reported as there is much illegalactivity in Somali waters, and the official statistics do not measure theimpact of piracy on Somali coastal trade. Some 16,000 ships a year pass throughthe Gulf of Aden, carrying oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia toEurope and North America. So one of the most important trade routes in theworld is now threatened by the chronic instability in Somalia. Piracy has been a problem in Somali waters for at least ten years. However, the number ofattempted and successful attacks has risen over the last three years. The onlyperiod during which piracy virtually vanished around Somalia was during the sixmonths of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the second half of 2006. Thisindicates that a functioning government in Somalia is capable of controllingpiracy. After the removal of the courts piracy re-emerged. With littlefunctioning government, long, isolated, sandy beaches and a population that isboth desperateand used to war, Somalia is a perfect environment for piracy to thrive.

1.Piracy around Somalia
1.1 How the pirates operate
Pirates operate using small skiffs with powerful outboardengines that can be pulled up onto the beach. These boats are fast andmaneuverable but they lack the range necessary for richer pickings. Pirates nowregularly use ‘mother ships’ to increase their range. The IMB recently put outa warning identifying potential mother ships.[2]These are generally fishing trawlers that the pirates capture closer to shoreand then use as staging posts for attacks further out to sea. Reports from aYemeni fishing vessel that appears to have been used as a mother ship indicatethat the pirates patrolled the entrance to the Gulf of Aden in the capturedvessel and then deserted it in their skiffs once a suitable target was spotted.The use of mother ships helps to explain how pirates have managed to increasetheir range so dramatically; the old warning to stay at least 50 nautical milesfrom the coast has now been replaced by warnings to stay at least 200 nauticalmiles away. It is generally thought that from sighting pirates to being boardedtakes approximately fifteen minutes. Such a short space of time helps toexplain why even with international patrols in the area ships are stillcaptured. To prevent an attack a naval vessel would need to be close and have ahelicopter ready to go at moment’s notice. This is not to say that preventionis impossible: the USS Peleliuwas able to scare pirates away from the Gemof Kilakarion 8 August 2008 after launching helicopters, but the Peleliuwas only ten miles away and able to respond quickly. In other circumstancescaptains must take whatever evasive action they can. In one instance a tugboatput itself into a high-speed spin and continued until the attackers gave up andleft. Other less nauseous ways of preventing boarding include sonic cannon andwater guns. Sonic cannon can only point in one direction, however, so an attackby more than one skiff renders them ineffective. The other serious complaintabout using non-lethal weapons to deter pirates is the lack of protection they offerto crew members, who become sitting targets for pirates with automatic weaponsand rocket launchers while operating the device. It is possible to identify thefactors that make a ship more vulnerable: low sides, low speed, low crew numbersand lack of adequate watch-keeping. Pirates have consistently targeted shipswith low sides (including Le Ponantand the Danica White) as these areeasier to board from their own low skiffs. At present it seems that scaling thehigh sides of large oil tankers is beyond their capabilities. It should bepointed out that this did not prevent them from taking speculative pot shots atthe Japanese tanker MV Takayama with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).[3]Low speeds also make a vessel more vulnerable; the pirates’ small vessels canmove fast and sluggish transport tankers and pleasure yachts will havedifficulty evading determined attackers. There is little that a ship-owner witha slow, low-sided ship can do in such circumstances. But some problems can beameliorated. Low crew numbers have become increasingly common as higherinsurance premiums and fuel costs cut into ship-owner’s margins. Without a fullcomplement of crew it is impossible to maintain a sufficient watch in dangerouswaters, making evasive measures less effective.
1.2 Where the pirates originate
Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in the northeast of thecountry, appears to be the base for most pirates in Somalia. A small number ofacts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden may originate in Yemen but most illegal activityoriginating there is connected to fishing and protecting fishing grounds.Traditionally, most pirates, including the infamous Afweyne, come fromHarardheere (Xaradheere) and Hobyo in Central Somalia – although Afweyne isreportedly unlikely to be involved in current operations. The Mayor of Eyl hasasserted that ‘the pirates who hijacked the ships are the same ones whoreceived ransom payments before’. This would support other reports that thepirates are not engaged only in one-off attacks but are in the business for thelong term. The fact that the pirates originate from Puntland is significant asthis is also the home region of President Abdullahi Yusuf. As one expert said,‘money will go to Yusuf as a gesture of goodwill to a regional leader – so evenif the higher echelons of Somali government and clan structure are not directlyinvolved in organizing piracy, they probably do benefit. Puntland is one of thepoorest areas of Somalia, so the financial attraction of piracy is strong. Somalia’s fishing industry has collapsed in the last fifteen years and its waters are beingheavily fished by European, Asian and African ships. Some pirates have claimedthat they are involved in protecting Somalia’s natural resources and thatransom payments should be viewed as legitimate taxation. Indeed the piratescaptured by France following the Le Ponant incident had a manual of goodconduct. In any case, in a region where legitimate business is difficult, wheredrought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming, andinstability and violence make death a very real prospect, the dangers ofengaging in piracy must be weighed against the potentially massive returns. (Anunsubstantiated rumour offers a further hint as to the emergence of piracy in Somalia and illustrates how good intentions can backfire. In the 1990s a private securityfirm had a contract to establish coastguard facilities. The exercise fizzledout but some analysts now trace the nautical skills of the pirates to thatexperiment and anecdotal evidence suggests that equipment meant for thecoastguard has been used in piracy expeditions. Captured sailors have alsoreported that pirates who held them claimed to have been former coastguards –see Box 1.) The small village of Eyl and others right up to the tip of Somalia have played host to many recently hijacked ships. The pirates have generally takencaptured vessels to small ports like Eyl and held them there until ransom hasbeen paid. The notable exception to this rule was the case of Juen K. andSabine M., the German achters taken into the mountains and held on land ordaysuntil they were released on 9 August following a ransom payment believed to bebetween alf-a-million and one million dollars.14 Clearly, the difference herewas that the vessel itself held no value but the two sailors did.
1.3 Ransoms
If Somalia provides the perfect environment for piracy, it isthe payment of massive ransoms that provides the motivation. A few years agoransoms were in the tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars range. So far in2008 they have hovered between half-a-million and two million dollars, althoughrecent reports indicate that demands have again shot up; $3.5 million has beendemanded for the release of the MV Stella Mariswhich has been heldsince 20 July.15 Total ransom payments for 2008 probably lie in the range of US$18–30million. Inflation of ransom demands makes this an ever more lucrativebusiness. Shipping firms, and sometimes governments, are prepared to pay thesesums since they are relatively small compared with the value of a ship, letalone the life of crew members. The internationalshipping association BIMCO hassaid that the payment of ransoms has probably exacerbated the situation andwould prefer the industry not to pay, but it recognizes that there is littlealternative as long as any sort of rescue or intervention is unlikely. Aspirates become more brazen, it seems unlikely that shipping firms will beprepared to risk the loss of life and equipment for the greater good.
1.4 New trends
The most noticeable change in the past year has been theshift in the main area of activity. Whereas in 2007 a lot of piracy was focused on Southern Somalia and Mogadishu port where, according to the UNmonitoring group, port officials helped facilitate several attacks,[4]in 2008 the vast majority of attacks have taken place in the Gulf of Aden. Thismakes sense since, as noted above, the Gulf is a major shipping route witharound 16,000 vessels passing through each year and offers much richer pickingsthan Mogadishu. The funnel-like shape of the Gulf also means that shipping iseasier to locate and hunt down than in the sea off Somalia’s southern coast. Aswill be discussed below, this shift in focus should be of great concern to theinternational community.
The pirates have improved their equipment and now use GPSsystems and satellite phones. It is also likely that they are plugged into aninternational network that feeds information from ports in the Gulf, Europe andAsia back to Somalia. All this, coupled with their use of mother ships, nowgives them a greater ability to find and capture potential targets. Pirates areno longer simply opportunists; their operations are becoming increasinglysophisticated and are likely to continue developing in this direction ifresponses do not change. Establishing how organized the piracy gangs are isdifficult but the growth in activity in 2008 seems to indicate that this isbecoming an increasingly professional operation. Some reports say numbers ofpirates have increased from the hundreds to the thousands.
Worryingly, it appears that pirates are becoming moreaggressive; East Africa analysts report that pirates are using MANPADS (ManPortable Air Defence Systems) in territorial waters and several recent reportsindicate that they have begun to use RPGs during their attacks. In the pasttheir method of attack was limited to firing automatic weapons as theyapproached a vessel, and the use of grenade launchers introduces a much greaterrisk of loss of life and damage to property. The firing of RPGs at tankers(such as at the Takayama) should be a reason for grave concern, particularlybecause of the risk of fire. In general captured crew are well treated,although the enormous psychological strain should not be underestimated, buttwo examples demonstrate that there is nothing romantic about being held bypirates. The two German yachters referred to earlier reported that they hadbeen beaten, and crew aboard the Lehmann Timberreported that theylacked food and water and that their captors were becoming increasingly erraticas their captivity dragged on.[5] The firstreported fatality was reported by the Malaysian International ShippingCorporation (MISC) onAugust 2008 after pirates had boarded a palm oil tankerthree days earlier. If pirates are becoming more ruthless it is likely to beonly a matter of time before more people are killed. And operating in an areafull of rich pickings and with enormous rewards on offer seems likely to pointto a trajectory of increasing ruthlessness.
1.5The international response
The international community has made several attempts to dealwith the issue of piracy around Somalia. The most successful has been escortsfor World Food Programme ships which had been unable to enter Somali watersuntil France, Denmark, the Netherlands and most recently Canada agreed toprovide naval escorts from November 2007 to June 2008. A more general approach has focused on Combined Taskforce 150 (CTF150), a coalition navaltaskforce covering the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. CTF150’s primary responsibility is to assist in the ‘war onterror’, so piracy is lower on their list of priorities. However some of theroughly fifteen ships making up CTF150 have been involved in deterring pirateattacks. To strengthen the hand of international naval forces, on 2 June 2008the UN Security Council passed the US/France-sponsored resolution 1816 thatgives foreign warships the right to enter Somali waters ‘for the purposes ofrepressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea’ by ‘all necessary means’[6]The most recent initiative involves the establishment of a ‘Maritime SecurityPatrol Area’ (MSPA) which coalition navies will patrol. The hope is thatshipping will stay in these zones and hence be in range of military assistanceif they are threatened. To date these measures do not seem to have had muchimpact, although it is too early to comment on the efficacy of the MSPA.
The hijack of two Malaysian tankers prompted Malaysia to sendthree ships to the Gulf of Aden in September 2008; however, these will onlyhave responsibility for escorting MISC ships.24 In recent years India has begunto take a greater interest in the African side of the Indian Ocean Rim for anumber of reasons including a desire to compete with China, but the danger ofpiracy is also of concern. The Indian navy has indicated a willingness to sendsupport to the Gulf of Aden. Indeed it has gone so far as tore mind thegovernment that it is ready to help ships carrying Indian nationals. However,analysts assert that the Indian government is reluctant to involve itself withthe internal affairs of another country.
To date France is the country that has taken the most robuststand against piracy off Somalia. Following the ransom payment and the releaseof Le Ponant, French naval special forces tracked down and arrested six pirateswho are now awaiting trial in France. Again, when a French pleasure yacht wascaptured on 2 September, President Sarkozy authorized a successful assault onthe boat that rescued the sailors, killed one pirate and captured the rest.Although French action is robust, it is unlikely to act as a deterrent forfuture attacks since the potential rewards of piracy still far outweigh thepotential risks. So far the two operations have not resulted in the death of ahostage but that is a danger that must be considered before future operationsare launched. Resources concentrated on preventing piracywill produce greaterbenefits than those used on dramatic rescues. The EU has established a missionunder the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) to provide a coordinationcell (EU NAVCO) for the fight against piracy.[7]
Coordination of the different naval and air assets in theregion could help to improve the efficacy of the fight against piracy. However,at present this cell consists of Commander Andres Breijo-Claur, seconded fromthe Spanish navy, and only four others, who will receive only 60,000 euro tofacilitate their work. While it is to be welcomed that the EU is taking some action,and the difficulty in organizing common defence action is recognized, thiseffort may well turn out to be more symbolic than practical. The area ofcoordination is one in which the EU could provide very useful assistance if thecell is properly staffed and financed.

Box 1: A victim’sstory
Captain Darch was the skipper of the SvitzerKorsakov when it was boarded by pirates on 1 February 2008. He and his fivecrew mates were held for 47 days, until 18 March.
At about 3pm on Friday 1 February, seventy miles north of Cape Gwardafuy, I was alerted by a shout. On our starboard side were five pirates in asix-metre white plastic boat powered by 48hp Yamaha engines. I thrashed the tugto the left, then right, forcing them to sheer away. This cat and mouse gamecontinued until another boat with four more approached. I knew we couldn’tavoid them so I stopped our engine. The pirates next attempted to winch theirboats to ours but only succeeded in dumping their spare ammunition into thesea. Later the first onto to the bridge said; ‘I am Andrew and speak English.This is Omar, our Captain. Do as you are told.’
On the orders of ‘Capt. Omar’ we moved south. By late Sundaywe arrived in Eyl where15 more pirates boarded our ship. From then on aroundtwenty were always aboard, including their personal Mullah. I convinced Omar tolet us go north to Gabbac, a more sheltered spot. One pirate called Ahmed toldus he had been in the coastguard, and only Ahmed and one or two others who hadalso been coastguards understood our engines. From then on we were trailed by a US warship and smaller Somali boats resupplied us.
The pirates, armed with AK47s, spent every day chewing khat.We survived on cigarettes, water, goat, camel’s milk and chapattis. Ourrelationship with the pirates was mostly amicable except for one incident. Omarkept saying ‘go on – go on’ but the anchorage wasn’t safe. He hit me across theback of my head. I said we wouldn’t go anywhere if he hit me again and hedidn’t. Later another man called Omar joined us. He said he was there to makesure we were looked after. During the ordeal, I lost weight but was neverreally hungry. Genuinely, I think they just needed the money.
Ten days after our capture the Chief Engineer – Fred – and Ihatched a plan. I tried to get a coded message to the Americans via Copenhagen. At midnight on the 11th we blacked out the ship and blockaded ourselves intothe ballast tank. We listened for the attack, but all we could hear was theSomalis trying to get at us. At five in the afternoon we tried to giveourselves up but they had bolted us in.
We thumped on the door and they let us out at seven. Afterthis we lost all our privileges and they followed us everywhere. Sometimes, astime dragged on, the younger pirates suggested killing the Russians and sinkingthe boat. They thought Fred and I were more valuable. Every day we talked aboutthe ransom. Initially they asked for $2.5 million but Fred convinced them thecompany would never give that much. During the negotiations one time the newinterpreter (Geli), a schoolteacher, said: ‘Look, here this is your last chance– give us the money in three days or the crew will be shot, you can put that inyour pipe and smoke it.’ The negotiations were handled by Control Risks whohave experience at that. They later tried $900,000 but eventually settled for$678,000. The money was assembled as cash in Dubai where they hoped a Somalibusinessman would handle the delivery for them, but no one would. In the endthe money came on a boat. It came alongside with the crew hidden. Our pirateswent over and moved the money across. Now the pirates had the boat, the crewand the money! All night the pirates divided the money between themselves. Mostleft in the morning but Omar and the schoolteacher said it wasn’t safe for themto go ashore here, so we dropped them further north. Next day we met up withthe warship. I asked why they didn’t attack; one guy said they hadn’t receivedthe message; another said: ‘Even if we had received it we’d need an order fromhigher up to do anything.’ We were held for 47 days. We went from Oman to Dubai, where we met our wives. I said it was the trip to end all trips but I’ve been on afew since then.
Source: Interview with the author, 15 September2008

2.Why it matters to the international community
There are deeper reasons why the international communityneeds to take heed of this problem than simple law enforcement. They can bedivided into four areas:
what piracy does to Somalia;
what it does to international trade, especially oil;
the danger to the environment;
the potential terrorist threat.
2.1 What piracy does to Somalia
The danger of Somali waters in late 2007 forced the WFP tosuspend food deliveries by sea (delivery by land is just as risky and isimpractical for transporting large quantities of food aid). According to theWFP, Somalia will require at least 185,000 tonnes of food aid in 2008. This wastemporarily solved by the naval escorts for WFP vessels mentioned above. TheWFP was forced to stop for two months when the Netherlands completed its stintuntil Canada announced that the HMCS Ville deQuébec would escortWFP deliveries. Without the naval escorts and the regular delivery of food aid, Somalia’s food stocks were seriously threatened. In a country without afunctioning central government that is suffering from drought and war, and withover a million internally displaced people,[8]imported food aid is essential. The uncertainty surrounding escorts for WFPships needs to end and escorts should be pledged in advance so that dangerousgaps in food delivery can be avoided. If the international community does onlyone thing, then ensuring the safe delivery of food aid should be the priority. Somalia is one of the most dangerous and violent places in the world. Arms are freelyavailable throughout the country and there are almost daily reports ofexplosions, murders, skirmishes, battles and kidnappings across the country.While pirates themselves keep the majority of the funds they generate, asignificant amount is passed on to important locals, some of whom are involvedin the ongoing war. These regular injections of cash undoubtedly help tofinance the war. Some reports31 link piracy money to the US terror-listed Al Shabaab, which emerged as a youth militia during the rule of the Islamic Courtsand is now fighting an insurgency against Ethiopian and government troops.Eradicating piracy will not stop the war, but it may reduce the money availablefor arms purchases.
The lack of maritime security also allows a busy people- andarms-smuggling trade to flourish and encourages illegal fishing in Somaliwaters. Greater efforts by the international community to combat piracy shouldhave a positive impact in these areas as well.
2.2 What piracy does to international trade
Clearly a company whose cargo is prevented from reaching itsdestination on time will lose money. Add to this the cost of paying ransoms andalready the damaging economic effect of Somali piracy can be seen. Theconsequences are not limited only to companies whose vessels are hijacked; ofwider concern is the growth of insurance premiums for ships that need to passthrough the Gulf of Aden. The danger means that war risk insurance premiumsmust now be paid: premiums are reported to have risen tenfold in a year.[9]If the cost of extra insurance becomes prohibitive, or the danger simply toogreat, shipping companies may avoid the Gulf of Aden and take the long route toEurope and North America around the Cape of Good Hope. Indeed this option ismentioned by shipping industry insiders as a very real possibility. The extraweeks of travel and fuel consumption would add considerably to the cost oftransporting goods. At a time when the price of oil is a major concern,anything that could contribute to a further rise in prices must be consideredvery serious indeed.
2.3 Potential environmental catastrophe
Large oil tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden and thedanger exists that a pirate attack could cause amajor oil spill in what is avery sensitive and important ecosystem. During the attack on the Takayamatheship’s fuel tanks were penetrated and oil spilled into the sea. Theconsequences of amore sustained attack could be much worse. As pirates becomebolder and use ever more powerful weaponry a tanker could be set on fire, sunkor forced ashore, any of which could result in an environmental catastrophethat would devastate marine and bird life for years to come. The pirates’ aimis to extort ransom payments and to date that has been their main focus;however, the possibility that they could destroy shipping is very real.
2.4 Possible co-opting by international terrorist networks
The other worst-case scenario is that pirates become agentsof international terrorism. It should be emphasized that to date there is nofirm evidence of this happening. However, in a region that saw the attacks onthe USS Cole, seaborne terrorism needs to be taken very seriously. For example,a large ship sunk in the approach to the Suez Canal would have a devastatingimpact on international trade. Terrorism at sea could take many forms: directattacks on naval or commercial shipping, such as the 6 October 2002 attack onthe MV Limburg,[10]hostages frompleasure boats being used as bargaining chips for terrorists or high-profilevictims of an atrocity, and hijacked ships being used as floating weapons. Terroristnetworks could also use the financial returns of piracy to fund theiractivities around the world.
The potentially massive consequences of this scenario must betaken into account along with the more likely scenario that piracy money isbeing routed to Al Shabaab. As has been seen over the last year, pirates in Somalia have become ever more dangerous, but it is impossible to tell what will happennext. It is best to act to prevent the worst-case scenarios rather than try tosolve the problem once it has escalated.

Box 2: Privatesecurity and Somali piracy
Private security firms have a long history of involvement inattempting to combat Somali piracy. To date, however, none have been veryeffective and in the majority of cases it is hard to see that anything at allwas achieved.
Secopex
This French private security firm signed an agreement in May2008 with TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf to provide maritime security for Somalia and a bodyguard for the president. The TFG insists that the deal will be paid forby the international community, but so far the $50–200 million needed has notbeen forthcoming.
Topcat
In November 2005 the TFG signed a $50 million or $55 millioncontract with the US security firm Topcat to target ‘mother ships’ being usedby Somali pirates. The chief executive of Topcat told the BBC, ’We will end thepiracy very quickly; there is no question about that’(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4471536.stm). Topcat’s deployment wasblocked by the US State Department, which judged that it would breach the armsembargo on Somalia.
Al-Habiibi Marine Service
This Saudi-based company was appointed by the government ofPuntland in December 2005. However its employees were unable to take up theirpositions in Somalia.
SOMCAN – Somali Canadian Coastguard
SOMCAN held a contract from the government of Puntland from2002 to 2005 to provide coastguard facilities for Puntland. Its effectivenesswas called into question as three of the company’s employees were sentenced toten years in jail in Thailand for piracy, although they claimed to have been protectinga Thai fishing boat.
Puntland International Development Corporation PIDC wascontracted in 2000 by the government of Puntland to combat piracy. Itsubcontracted the work to Hart Security.
HART Security Hart undertook to provide training for a 70-manmaritime force in Puntland from November 1999. A vessel was secured and arms were procured through local arms markets. Hart staff took upresidence in Somalia. The scheme was supposed to be funded through thecollection of fishing dues. Hart wrapped up its operations in June 2002 when itbecame unclear if a new administration in Puntland had the authority to honourtheir contract.

3.Options for the international community
Although the international community must recognize that onlya political solution in Somalia offers a long-term solution to the issue ofpiracy, it is also crucial to understand that measures can be taken to improvethe situation while efforts continue towards a political settlement. Set outbelow are a number of options that could be considered by the internationalcommunity, the African Union and Somalia’s neighbors to reduce the risks ofpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. It may be that elementsfrom each option could be adopted.
3.1 Organize shipping into a safe lane
At the end of August 2008 coalition naval forces in the Gulf of Aden announced that they had established a ‘Maritime Security Patrol Area’ (MSPA)which would be patrolled by coalition warships and aircraft. Following astandard route should make it easier for international forces in the area tomonitor shipping and respond to distress calls. Problems with this approacharise if the international presence is too light. Shipping organized in a lanewould potentially offer an easier target for pirates and, as one senior navalcommander explained, ‘the pirates will just change their tactics’. The approachwill also fail to reduce the danger for ships steaming north-south rather thaneast-west. However, this move is to be welcomed. The international communityshould recognize that even if attacks decrease the threat will not havedisappeared, and it will need to remain vigilant until Somalia has a full political settlement.

3.2Provide a coastguard for Somalia
In the absence of a reliable and long-term government of Somalia it is unlikely that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has the capacity to operate effectivecoastguard facilities. An effective option may be to create an internationallysanctioned and administered coastguard for Somalia. This could be run by the UNor African Union and established with external funds. The cost of running acoastguard could be met, at least in part, from collecting fishing dues andimport revenue. The money and the force could be held in trust for Somalia. Clearly lessons can be learned from the previous experience of private military companiestrying to provide maritime security (see Box 2); hence this option would needto be firmly under the control of an international body.
3.3 A large naval presence
A proposal popular for its simplicity and straightforwardnessis for the deployment of a much larger multinational naval force in the Gulf ofAden and along the Somali coast with a specific mandate to combat piracy. Atpresent the 12–15 ships of Combined Taskforce 150 are primarily involved in thewar on terror and combating piracy is an ancillary concern. A much largerdedicated fleet would be likely to reduce the incidence of piracy but is almostcertainly prohibitively expensive. It seems more realistic to hope for some augmentationof the current force to patrol the MSPA and perhaps the ongoing discussions inEurope and India will produce such a result.
3.4 Pay no ransoms
This option has been suggested by the shipping industry.Certainly it seems likely that if ransom payments stopped, the incentives to beinvolved in piracy would decrease.
Two problems are evident here. The first is that there is noreason why pirates would not change their tactics and, copying examples fromIndonesia and elsewhere, begin to see the value not in ransom but in capturingships and creating phantom ships, where a stolen ship is re-registered and usedto carry new cargoes which are then stolen,35 or simply targeting vessels tosteal their cargo. The second problem is of course that non-payment could verywell include the loss of life. It seems unlikely that any shipping companywants to be the first to refuse to pay when the price could be so high.However, a concerted effort to deflate prices (there is no need to pay exactly whatis demanded) could have a positive impact.
3.5 Do nothing
Accepting that the only real solution lies in a politicalsolution inside Somalia, the international community could calculate that someforty ships captured out of 16,000 is such a small number that the resourcesrequired to protect them would be wasted. However, as we have seen, the issueof piracy is not divorced from Somalia’s internal problems, and the potentialfor an environmental disaster, a terrorist attack or major disruption of tradeand subsequent increase in oil prices makes the case for preventative action astrong one.

4. Anti-piracy measures. Militarypresence
Inresponse to the increased activity of the INS Tabar, India sought to augment its naval force in the Gulf of Aden by deploying thelarger INS Mysoreto patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states, including the U.S. and France, who are permitted toenter its territorial waters, extending up to 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the coastline, in an effort to check piracy. An Indian naval official confirmedreceipt of a letter acceding to India's prerogative to check such piracy.«We had put up a request before the Somali government to play a greaterrole in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden in view of the United Nationsresolution. The TFG government gave its nod recently.» India also expressed consideration to deploy up to four more warships inthe region.Similarly, Russia also chose to send more warships to combat piracynear Somalia. This announcement followed the InternationalMaritime Bureau terming the menace as having gone «out ofcontrol.» Germany said it was willing to add 1,400 troops to join an E.U.mission in the area that would begin in December. Africomcommander, General William Ward, added thatthe United States was concerned about the rise in piracy, and was involved inmultilateral efforts to provide security, «The United States isparticipating in those activities currently, but again, that is notspecifically being controlled by the United States Africa Command.» Amaritime conference was also held in Mombasato discuss the rising concern of regional piracy with a view to give regionaland world governments recommendations to deal with the menace. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF)organized the regional an African maritime unions’ conference, a first of itskind in Africa. Godfrey Matata Onyango, executive secretary of the Northern Corridor Transport Coordination Authoritysaid that «We cannot ignore to discuss the piracy menace since it poses ahuge challenge to the maritime industry and if not controlled, it threats tochop off the regional internal trade. The cost of shipping will definitely riseas a result of the increased war insurance premium due to the high risk off the Gulf of Aden.» Pakistan offered theservices of Pakistan Navy to the United Nations in order to help combat the piracy in Somalia. Pakistan had a number of conditions that had to be met before itwould get involved though. On December 16, 2008, the China'sXinhua News Agency announced that China was«seriously considering sending naval ships to the Gulf of Aden and watersoff the Somali coast for escorting operations in the near future», inretaliation to the seizure of Hong Kong andChinese ships. China announced on 18 December 2008, that it would be deployingnaval forces to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. Chinese state media hassuggested that a force of two destroyers and a supply ship will be sent to joinanti-piracy operations off the coast.[11]

Conclusion
Whatever the international community decides to do, it mustnot be at the expense of efforts to secure a political solution inside Somalia. The most powerful weapon against piracy will be peace and opportunity in Somalia, coupled with an effective andforce and judiciary. Containing or ignoring Somalia and its problems is not an option that will end well. Piracy is a very real threat toseafarers, the shipping industry, the environment, international trade and mostof all Somalia and Somalis. There is no single solution, but this paper has highlightedsome of the actions that may assist in reducing the threat. If nothing else, itis essential that the international community formulate a plan to ensure thatthe supply of food aid to Somalia is not interrupted. In the next three monthsit is of paramount importance that a replacement for Canada is found to escortWFP ships. If there is no permanent solution to the issue of escorting WFPships, then Somalis will starve and the already severe problems in the regionare likely to get worse. The international community cannot view the issue ofSomali piracy as a sideline issue. The danger that international shipping willavoid the Gulf of Aden and that the subsequent increased costs will be passedon to consumers should be of grave concern during a time of economicuncertainty. The potential environmental damage from a botched attack could becatastrophic and long-lasting. And if the nightmare scenario occurs and Somalipirates become tools of international terrorism, failure to act now will seemvery reckless.

Listof addresses
1.IMB,Pictures of suspected pirate mother vessels, 13 August 2008.www.icc-ccs.org/main/piracy_al.php?newsid=20, accessed 21 August 2008.
2. Johan Lillkung,«They opened fire with machine guns androckets», The Observer. 27 April 2008.
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/27/somalia.
3.Reportof the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1766(2007). 24 April 2008.
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/290/68/PDF/N0829068.pdf?OpenElement.
4.Reportof the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1766(2007). 24 April 2008.
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/290/68/PDF/N0829068.pdf?OpenElement.
5.UNSC Resolution 1816.www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,,SOM,,48464c622,0.html.
6.Official Journal of the European Union L 252/39, 20 September 2008.
eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do.
7.InternalDisplacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement – Global Overview ofTrends and Developments in 2007, April 2008.
www.internal-displacement.org/.
8.MilesCostello, «Shipping insurance costs soar with piracy surge off Somalia», The Times, 11 September 2008.
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece.
9.MilesCostello, «Shipping insurance costs soar with piracy surge off Somalia», The Times, 11 September 2008.
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece.
10. Yemen ship attack «was terrorism» BBC,13 October 2003.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm.