The Science Of Grammar

Министерство образования РеспубликиБеларусь
Учреждение образования
«Гомельский государственныйуниверситет
им. Ф. Скорины»
Филологическийфакультет
THE SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR
Курсовая работа
Исполнитель:
Студенткагруппы К-42
ЛапицкаяТ.Е.
Гомель 2006

Содержание
Introduction
1. Grammar bears to language
2. Grammar is the art of writing and speakingcorrectly
3. The term grammar
4. The composition of language
Conclusion
Literature
 

Introduction
«Haec deGrammatica quam brevissime potui: non ut omnia dicerem sectatus, (quodinfinitum erat,) sed ut maxima necessaria.»--QUINTILIAN. _De Inst. Orat._,Lib. i, Cap. x.
Language, in theproper sense of the term, is peculiar to man; so that, without a miraculousassumption of human powers, none but human beings can make words the vehicle ofthought. An imitation of some of the articulate sounds employed in speech, maybe exhibited by parrots, and sometimes by domesticated ravens, and we know thatalmost all brute animals have their peculiar natural voices, by which theyindicate their feelings, whether pleasing or painful. But language is anattribute of reason, and differs essentially not only from all brute voices,but even from all the chattering, jabbering, and babbling of our own species,in which there is not an intelligible meaning, with division of thought, anddistinction of words.
1. Grammar bears to language
Speech resultsfrom the joint exercise of the best and noblest faculties of human nature, fromour rational understanding and our social affection; and is, in the proper useof it, the peculiar ornament and distinction of man, whether we compare himwith other orders in the creation, or view him as an individual preeminentamong his fellows. Hence that science which makes known the nature andstructure of speech, and immediately concerns the correct and elegant use oflanguage, while it surpasses all the conceptions of the stupid or unlearned,and presents nothing that can seem desirable to the sensual and grovelling, hasan intrinsic dignity which highly commends it to all persons of sense and taste,and makes it most a favourite with the most gifted minds. That science isGrammar. And though there be some geniuses who affect to despise the trammelsof grammar rules, to whom it must be conceded that many things which have beenunskillfully taught as such, deserve to be despised; yet it is true, as Dr.Adam remarks, that, «The study of Grammar has been considered an object ofgreat importance by the wisest men in all ages.»--_Preface to Latin andEnglish Gram._, p. iii.
Grammar bears tolanguage several different relations, and acquires from each a nature leadingto a different definition. First, It is to language, as knowledge is tothe thing known; and as doctrine, to the truths it inculcates. In theserelations, grammar is a science. It is the first of what have been called theseven sciences, or liberal branches of knowledge; namely, grammar, logic,rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Secondly, It is asskill, to the thing to be done; and as power, to the instruments it employs. Inthese relations, grammar is an art; and as such, has long been defined,"_ars recte scribendi, recteque loquendi_" the art of writing andspeaking correctly. Thirdly, It is as navigation, to the ocean, whichnautic skill alone enables men to traverse. In this relation, theory andpractice combine, and grammar becomes, like navigation, a practical science. Fourthly,It is as a chart, to a coast which we would visit. In this relation, ourgrammar is a text-book, which we take as a guide, or use as a help to our ownobservation. Fifthly, It is as a single voyage, to the open sea, thehighway of nations. Such is our meaning, when we speak of the grammar of aparticular text or passage.
Again: Grammaris to language a sort of self-examination. It turns the faculty of speech orwriting upon itself for its own elucidation; and makes the tongue or the penexplain the uses and abuses to which both are liable, as well as the nature andexcellency of that power, of which, these are the two grand instruments. Fromthis account, some may begin to think that in treating of grammar we aredealing with something too various and changeable for the understanding tograsp; a dodging Proteus of the imagination, who is ever ready to assume somenew shape, and elude the vigilance of the inquirer. But let the reader orstudent do his part; and, if he please, follow us with attention. We willendeavour, with welded links, to bind this Proteus, in such a manner that heshall neither escape from our hold, nor fail to give to the consulter anintelligible and satisfactory response. Be not discouraged, generous youth.Hark to that sweet far-reaching note:
«Sed,quanto ille magis formas se vertet in omnes, Tanto, nate, magis contendetenacia vincla.» VIRGIL.
Geor. IV, 411.
«But thou,the more he varies forms, beware To strain his fetters with a strictercare.» DRYDEN'S VIRGIL.
If for a momentwe consider the good and the evil that are done in the world through the mediumof speech, we shall with one voice acknowledge, that not only the facultyitself, but also the manner in which it is used, is of incalculable importanceto the welfare of man. But this reflection does not directly enhance ourrespect for grammar, because it is not to language as the vehicle of moral orof immoral sentiment, of good or of evil to mankind, that the attention of thegrammarian is particularly directed. A consideration of the subject in theserelations, pertains rather to the moral philosopher. Nor are the arts of logicand rhetoric now considered to be properly within the grammarian's province.Modern science assigns to these their separate places, and restricts grammar,which at one period embraced all learning, to the knowledge of language, asrespects its fitness to be the vehicle of any particular thought or sentimentwhich the speaker or writer may wish to convey by it. Accordingly grammar iscommonly defined, by writers upon the subject, in the special sense of anart--«the art of speaking or writing a language with propriety orcorrectness.»--_Webster's Dict._ 2.Grammar is the art of writing and speaking correctly
Lily says,«Grammatica est recte scribendi atque loquendi ars;» that is,«Grammar is the art of writing and speaking correctly.» Despauter,too, in his definition, which is quoted in a preceding paragraph, notimproperly placed writing first, as being that with which grammar is primarilyconcerned. For it ought to be remembered, that over any fugitive colloquialdialect, which has never been fixed by visible signs, grammar has no control;and that the speaking which the art or science of grammar teaches, isexclusively that which has reference to a knowledge of letters. It is thecertain tendency of writing, to improve speech. And in proportion as books aremultiplied, and the knowledge of written language is diffused, local dialects,which are beneath the dignity of grammar, will always be found to grow fewer,and their differences less. There are, in the various parts of the world, manylanguages to which the art of grammar has never yet been applied; and to which,therefore, the definition or true idea of grammar, however general, does notproperly extend. And even where it has been applied, and is now honoured as apopular branch of study, there is yet great room for improvement: barbarismsand solecisms have not been rebuked away as they deserve to be.
Melancthon says,«Grammatica est certa loquendi ac scribendi ratio, Latinis Latine.»Vossius, «Ars bene loquendi eoque et scribendi, atque id LatinisLatine.» Dr. Prat, "_Grammatica est recte loquendi atque scribendiars._" Ruddiman also, in his Institutes of Latin Grammar, reversed theterms writing and speaking, and defined grammar, "_ars receloquendi scribendique_;" and, either from mere imitation, or from thegeneral observation that speech precedes writing, this arrangement of the wordshas been followed by most modern grammarians. Dr. Lowth embraces both terms ina more general one, and says, «Grammar is the art of rightly expressingour thoughts by words.» It is, however, the province of grammar, toguide us not merely in the expression of our own thoughts, but also in ourapprehension of the thoughts, and our interpretation of the words, of others.Hence, Perizonius, in commenting upon Sanctius's imperfect definition,"_Grammatica est ars recte loquendi_," not improperly asks, "_etquidni intelligendi et explicandi_?" «and why not also ofunderstanding and explaining?» Hence, too, the art of reading isvirtually a part of grammar; for it is but the art of understanding andspeaking correctly that which we have before us on paper. And Nugent hasaccordingly given us the following definition: «Grammar is the art ofreading, speaking, and writing a language by rules.»--_Introduction toDict._, p. xii.[1]
The word_recte_, rightly, truly, correctly, which occurs in most of the foregoing Latindefinitions, is censured by the learned Richard Johnson, in his GrammaticalCommentaries, on account of the vagueness of its meaning. He says, it is notonly ambiguous by reason of its different uses in the Latin classics, butdestitute of any signification proper to grammar. But even if this be true asregards its earlier application, it may well be questioned, whether byfrequency of use it has not acquired a signification which makes it proper atthe present time. The English word correctly seems to be less liable tosuch an objection; and either this brief term, or some other of like import,(as, «with correctness»--«with propriety,») is stillusually employed to tell what grammar is. But can a boy learn by such meanswhat it is, _to speak and write grammatically_? In one sense, he can; and in another, he cannot. He may derive, from any of these terms, some idea of grammaras distinguished from other arts; but no simple definition of this, or of anyother art, can communicate to him that learns it, the skill of an artist.
R. Johnsonspeaks at large of the relation of words to each other in sentences, asconstituting in his view the most essential part of grammar; and as being apoint very much overlooked, or very badly explained, by grammarians in general.His censure is just. And it seems to be as applicable to nearly all thegrammars now in use, as to those which he criticised a hundred and thirty yearsago. But perhaps he gives to the relation of words, (which is merely theirdependence on other words according to the sense,) an earlier introduction anda more prominent place, than it ought to have in a general system of grammar.To the right use of language, he makes four things to be necessary. In citingthese, I vary the language, but not the substance or the order of hispositions. First, That we should speak and write words according to thesignifications which belong to them: the teaching of which now pertains tolexicography, and not to grammar, except incidentally. " Secondly, Thatwe should observe the relations that words have one to another insentences, and represent those relations by such variations, and particles, asare usual with authors in that language." Thirdly, That we shouldacquire a knowledge of the proper sounds of the letters, and pay a due regardto accent in pronunciation. Fourthly, That we should learn to writewords with their proper letters, spelling them as literary men generally do.
         From these positions,(though he sets aside the first, as pertaining to lexicography, and not nowtogrammar, as it formerly did,) the learned critic deduces first his four partsof the subject, and then his definition of grammar. «Hence,» says he,«there arise Four Parts of Grammar; Analogy, which treats of the
several parts of speech, their definitions, accidents, and formations; Syntax,which treats of the use of those things in construction, according to theirrelations; Orthography, which treats of spelling; and Prosody, whichtreats of accenting in pronunciation. So, then, the true definition of Grammaris this: Grammar is the art of expressing the relations of things inconstruction, with due accent in speaking, and orthography in writing,accordingto the custom of those whose language we learn.» Again he adds: «Theword relation has other senses, taken by itself; but yet the relationof words one to another in a sentence, has no other signification
than what I intend by it, namely, of cause, effect, means, end, manner,instrument, object, adjunct, and the like; which are names given by logiciansto those relations under which the mind comprehends things, and therefore themost proper words to explain them to others. And if such things are too hardfor children, then grammar is too hard; for there neither is, nor can be, anygrammar without them. And a little experience will satisfy any man, that theyoung will as easily apprehend them, as _gender, number, declension_, and othergrammar-terms.» See _R. Johnson's Grammatical Commentaries_, p. 4.
It is true, thatthe _relation of words_--by which I mean that connexion between them, which thetrain of thought forms and suggests--or that dependence which one word has onan other according to the sense--lies at the foundation of all syntax. No ruleor principle of construction can ever have any applicability beyond the limits,or contrary to the order, of this relation. To see what it is in any givencase, is but to understand the meaning of the phrase or sentence. And it isplain, that no word ever necessarily agrees with an other, with which it is notthus connected in the mind of him who uses it. No word ever governs an other,to which the sense does not direct it. No word is ever required to standimmediately before or after an other, to which it has not some relationaccording to the meaning of the passage.
Here then arethe relation, agreement, government, and arrangement, of words in sentences;and these make up the whole of syntax--but not the whole of grammar. To thisone part of grammar, therefore, the relation of words is central andfundamental; and in the other parts also, there are some things to which theconsideration of it is incidental; but there are many more, like spelling,pronunciation, derivation, and whatsoever belongs merely to letters, syllables,and the forms of words, with which it has, in fact, no connexion. The relationof words, therefore, should be clearly and fully explained in its proper place,under the head of syntax; but the general idea of grammar will not be broughtnearer to truth, by making it to be «the art of expressing therelations of things in construction,» &c., according to theforegoing definition.
3 The term grammar
The term grammaris derived from the Greek word [Greek: gramma], a letter. The art orscience to which this term is applied, had its origin, not in cursory speech,but in the practice of writing; and speech, which is first in the order ofnature, is last with reference to grammar. The matter or common subject ofgrammar, is language in general; which, being of two kinds, spoken and written,consists of certain combinations either of sounds or of visible signs,employed for the expression of thought. Letters and sounds, though oftenheedlessly confounded in the definitions given of vowels, consonants, &c.,are, in their own nature, very different things. They address themselves todifferent senses; the former, to the sight; the latter, to the hearing. Yet, bya peculiar relation arbitrarily established between them, and in consequence ofan almost endless variety in the combinations of either, they coincide in amost admirable manner, to effect the great object for which language wasbestowed or invented; namely, to furnish a sure medium for the communication ofthought, and the preservation of knowledge.
All languages,however different, have many things in common. There are points of aphilosophical character, which result alike from the analysis of any language,and are founded on the very nature of human thought, and that of the sounds orother signs which are used to express it. When such principles alone are takenas the subject of inquiry, and are treated, as they sometimes have been,without regard to any of the idioms of particular languages, they constitutewhat is called General, Philosophical, or Universal Grammar. But to teach, withLindley Murray and some others, that «Grammar may be considered as consistingof two species, Universal and Particular,» and that the latter merely«applies those general principles to a particular language,» is toadopt a twofold absurdity at the outset.[2] For every cultivated language hasits particular grammar, in which whatsoever is universal, is necessarilyincluded; but of which, universal or general principles form only a part, andthat comparatively small. We find therefore in grammar no «twospecies» of the same genus; nor is the science or art, as commonly definedand understood, susceptible of division into any proper and distinct sorts,except with reference to different languages--as when we speak of Greek, Latin,French, or English grammar.
There is,however, as I have suggested, a certain science or philosophy of language,which has been denominated Universal Grammar; being made up of those pointsonly, in which many or all of the different languages preserved in books, arefound to coincide. All speculative minds are fond of generalization; and, inthe vastness of the views which may thus be taken of grammar, such may find anentertainment which theynever felt in merely learning to speak and writegrammatically. But the pleasure of such contemplations is not the earliest orthe most important fruit of the study. The first thing is, to know andunderstand the grammatical construction of our own language. Many may profit bythis acquisition, who extend not their inquiries to the analogies or the idiomsof other tongues. It is true, that every item of grammatical doctrine is themore worthy to be known and regarded, in proportion as it approaches touniversality. But the principles of all practical grammar, whether universal orparticular, common or peculiar, must first be learned in their application tosome one language, before they can be distinguished into such classes; and it ismanifest, both from reason and from experience, that the youth of any nationnot destitute of a good book for the purpose, may best acquire a knowledge ofthose principles, from the grammatical study of their native tongue.
Universal orPhilosophical Grammar is a large field for speculation and inquiry, andembraces many things which, though true enough in themselves, are unfit to beincorporated with any system of practical grammar, however comprehensive itsplan. Many authors have erred here. With what is merely theoretical, such asystem should have little to do. Philosophy, dealing in generalities, resolvesspeech not only as a whole into its constituent parts and separable elements,as anatomy shows the use and adaptation of the parts and joints of the humanbody; but also as a composite into its matter and form, as one may contemplatethat same body in its entireness, yet as consisting of materials, some solidand some fluid, and these curiously modelled to a particular figure. Grammar,properly so called, requires only the former of these analyses; and inconducting the same, it descends to the thousand minute particulars which arenecessary to be known in practice. Nor are such things to be despised astrivial and low: ignorance of what is common and elementary, is but the moredisgraceful for being ignorance of mere rudiments. «Wherefore,» saysQuintilian, «they are little to be respected, who represent this art asmean and barren; in which, unless you faithfully lay the foundation for thefuture orator, whatever superstructure you raise will tumble into ruins. It isan art, necessary to the young, pleasant to the old, the sweet companion of theretired, and one which in reference to every kind of study has in itself moreof utility than of show. Let no one therefore despise as inconsiderable theelements of grammar. Not because it is a great thing, to distinguish consonantsfrom vowels, and afterwards divide them into semivowels and mutes; but because,to those who enter the interior parts of this temple of science, there willappear in many things a great subtilty, which is fit not only to sharpen thewits of youth, but also to exercise the loftiest erudition andscience.»--De Institutione Oratoria, Lib. i, Cap. iv.4 The composition of language
Again, of thearts which spring from the composition of language. Here the art of logic,aiming solely at conviction, addresses the understanding with cool deductionsof unvarnished truth; rhetoric, designing to move, in some particulardirection, both the judgement and the sympathies of men, applies itself to theaffections in order to persuade; and poetry, various in its character andtendency, solicits the imagination, with a view to delight, and in general alsoto instruct. But grammar, though intimately connected with all these, andessential to them in practice, is still too distinct from each to be identifiedwith any of them. In regard to dignity and interest, these higher studies seemto have greatly the advantage over particular grammar; but who is willing to bean ungrammatical poet, orator, or logician? For him I do not write. But I wouldpersuade my readers, that an acquaintance with that grammar which respects thegenius of their vernacular tongue, is of primary importance to all who wouldcultivate a literary taste, and is a necessary introduction to the study ofother languages. And it may here be observed, for the encouragement of thestudent, that as grammar is essentially the same thing in all languages, he whohas well mastered that of his own, has overcome more than half the difficultyof learning another; and he whose knowledge of words is the most extensive, hasthe fewest obstacles to encounter in proceeding further.
It was the«original design» of grammar, says Dr. Adam, to facilitate «theacquisition of languages;» and, of all practical treatises on the subject,this is still the main purpose. In those books which are to prepare the learnerto translate from one tongue into another, seldom is any thing else attempted.In those also which profess to explain the right use of vernacular speech, mustthe same purpose be ever paramount, and the «original design» be keptin view. But the grammarian may teach many things incidentally. One cannotlearn a language, without learning at the same time a great many opinions,facts, and principles, of some kind or other, which are necessarily embodied init. For all language proceeds from, and is addressed to, the understanding; andhe that perceives not the meaning of what he reads, makes no acquisition evenof the language itself. To the science of grammar, the nature of the ideas conveyedby casual examples, is not very essential: to the learner, it is highlyimportant. The best thoughts in the best diction should furnish the models foryouthful study and imitation; because such language is not only the most worthyto be remembered, but the most easy to be understood. A distinction is also tobe made between use and abuse. In nonsense, absurdity, or falsehood, there cannever be any grammatical authority; because, however language may be abused,the usage which gives law to speech, is still that usage which is founded uponthe common sense of mankind.
Grammar appealsto reason, as well as to authority, but to what extent it should do so, hasbeen matter of dispute. «The knowledge of useful arts,» saysSanctius, «is not an invention of human ingenuity, but an emanation fromthe Deity, descending from above for the use of man, as Minerva sprung from thebrain of Jupiter. Wherefore, unless thou give thyself wholly to laboriousresearch into the nature of things, and diligently examine the causes andreasons of the art thou teachest, believe me, thou shalt but see with othermen's eyes, and hear with other men's ears. But the minds of many arepreoccupied with a certain perverse opinion, or rather ignorant conceit, thatin grammar, or the art of speaking, there are no causes, and that reason isscarcely to be appealed to for any thing;--than which idle notion, I know ofnothing more foolish;--nothing can be thought of which is more offensive. Shallman, endowed with reason, do, say, or contrive any thing, without design, andwithout understanding? Hear the philosophers; who positively declare thatnothing comes to pass without a cause. Hear Plato himself; who affirms thatnames and words subsist by nature, and contends that language is derived fromnature, and not from art.»
«Iknow,» says he, «that the Aristotelians think otherwise; but no onewill doubt that names are the signs, and as it were the instruments, of things.But the instrument of any art is so adapted to that art, that for any otherpurpose it must seem unfit; thus with an auger we bore, and with a saw we cutwood; but we split stones with wedges, and wedges are driven with heavy mauls.We cannot therefore but believe that those who first gave names to things, didit with design; and this, I imagine, Aristotle himself understood when he said,_ad placitum nomina significare._ For those who contend that names were made bychance, are no less audacious than if they would endeavour to persuade us, thatthe whole order of the universe was framed together fortuitously.»
«You willsee,» continues he, «that in the first language, whatever it was, thenames of things were taken from Nature herself; but, though I cannot affirmthis to have been the case in other tongues, yet I can easily persuade myselfthat in every tongue a reason can be rendered for the application of everyname; and that this reason, though it is in many cases obscure, is neverthelessworthy of investigation. Many things which were not known to the earlierphilosophers, were brought to light by Plato; after the death of Plato, manywere discovered by Aristotle; and Aristotle was ignorant of many which are noweverywhere known. For truth lies hid, but nothing is more precious than truth.But you will say, 'How can there be any certain origin to names, when one andthe same thing is called by different names, in the several parts of theworld?' I answer, of the same thing there may be different causes, of whichsome people may regard one, and others, an other. * * * There is therefore nodoubt, that of all things, even of words, a reason is to be rendered: and if weknow not what that reason is, when we are asked; we ought rather to confessthat we do not know, than to affirm that none can be given. I know thatScaliger thinks otherwise; but this is the true account of the matter.»
«Theseseveral observations,» he remarks further, «I have unwillinglybrought together against those stubborn critics who, while they explode reasonfrom grammar, insist so much on the testimonies of the learned. But have theynever read Quintilian, who says, (Lib. i, Cap. 6,) that, 'Language isestablished by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom?' He therefore does notexclude reason, but makes it the principal thing. Nay, in a manner, Laurentius,and other grammatists, even of their fooleries, are forward to offer reasons,such as they are. Moreover, use does not take place without reason;otherwise, it ought to be called abuse, and not use. But from use authorityderives all its force; for when it recedes from use, authority becomes nothing:whence Cicero reproves Coelius and Marcus Antonius for speaking according totheir own
fancy, and not according to use.But, 'Nothing can be lasting,' says Curtius, (Lib. iv,) 'which is not basedupon reason.' It remains, therefore, that of all things the reason be firstassigned; and then, if it can be done, we may bring forward testimonies; thatthe thing, having every advantage, may be made the more clear.»--Sanctii Minerva,Lib. i, Cap. 2.
ulius CaesarScaliger, from whose opinion Sanctius dissents above, seems to limit thescience of grammar to bounds considerably too narrow, though he found withinthem room for the exercise of much ingenuity and learning. He says,«Grammatica est scientia loquendi ex usu; neque enim constituit regulasscientibus usus modum, sed ex eorum statis frequentibusque usurpatiombuscolligit communem rationem loquendi, quam discentibus traderet.»--_DeCausis L. Latinae_, Lib. iv, Cap. 76. «Grammar is the science of speakingaccording to use; for it does not establish rules for those who know the mannerof use, but from the settled and frequent usages of these, gathers the commonfashion of speaking, which it should deliver to learners.» This limitedview seems not only to exclude from the science the use of the pen, but toexempt the learned from any obligation to respect the rules prescribed for theinitiation of the young. But I have said, and with abundant authority, that theacquisition of a good style of writing is the main purpose of the study; and,surely, the proficients and adepts in the art can desire for themselves no suchexemption. Men of genius, indeed, sometimes affect to despise the pettiness ofall grammatical instructions; but this can be nothing else than affectation,since the usage of the learned is confessedly the basis of all suchinstructions, and several of the loftiest of their own rank appear on the listof grammarians.
Quintilian,whose authority is appealed to above, belonged to that age in which theexegesis of histories, poems, and other writings, was considered an essentialpart of grammar. He therefore, as well as Diomedes, and other ancient writers,divided the grammarian's duties into two parts; the one including what is nowcalled grammar, and the other the explanation of authors, and the stigmatizingof the unworthy. Of the opinion referred to by Sanctius, it seems proper tomake here an ampler citation. It shall be attempted in English, though theparagraph is not an easy one to translate. I understand the author to say,«Speakers, too, have their rules to observe; and writers, theirs. Languageis established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom. Of reason the chiefground is analogy, but sometimes etymology. Ancient things have a certainmajesty, and, as I might say, religion, to commend them. Authority is wont tobe sought from orators and historians; the necessity of metre mostly excusesthe poets. When the judgement of the chief masters of eloquence passes forreason, even error seems right to those who follow great leaders. But, of theart of speaking, custom is the surest mistress; for speech is evidently to beused as money, which has upon it a public stamp. Yet all these things require apenetrating judgement, especially analogy; the force of which is, that one mayrefer what is doubtful, to something similar that is clearly established, andthus prove uncertain things by those which are sure.»--QUINT, _de Inst.Orat._, Lib. i, Cap. 6, p. 48.
He science ofgrammar, whatever we may suppose to be its just limits, does not appear to havebeen better cultivated in proportion as its scope was narrowed. Nor has itsapplication to our tongue, in particular, ever been made in such a manner, asto do great honour to the learning or the talents of him that attemptedit. What is new to a nation, may be old to the world. The development of theintellectual powers of youth by instruction in the classics, as well as theimprovement of their taste by the exhibition of what is elegant in literature,is continually engaging the attention of new masters, some of whom may seem toeffect great improvements; but we must remember that the concern itself is ofno recent origin. Plato and Aristotle, who were great masters both of grammarand of philosophy, taught these things ably at Athens, in the fourth century beforeChrist. Varro, the grammarian, usually styled the most learned of theRomans, was contemporary with the Saviour and his apostles. Quintilianlived in the first century of our era, and before he wrote his mostcelebrated book, taught a school twenty years in Rome, and received from thestate a salary which made him rich. This «consummate guide of waywardyouth,» as the poet Martial called him, being neither ignorant of what hadbeen done by others, nor disposed to think it a light task to prescribe theright use of his own language, was at first slow to undertake the work upon whichhis fame now reposes; and, after it was begun, diligent to execute it worthily,that it might turn both to his own honour, and to the real advancement oflearning.He says, at the commencement of his book: «After I had obtained aquiet release from those labours which for twenty years had devolved upon me asan instructor of youth, certain persons familiarly demanded of me, that Ishould compose something concerning the proper manner of speaking; but for along time I withstood their solicitations, because I knew there were alreadyillustrious authors in each language, by whom many things which might pertainto such a work, had been very diligently written, and left to posterity. Butthe reason which I thought would obtain for me an easier excuse, did but excitemore earnest entreaty; because, amidst the various opinions of earlier writers,some of whom were not even consistent with themselves, the choice had becomedifficult; so that my friends seemed to have a right to enjoin upon me, if notthe labour of producing new instructions, at least that of judging concerningthe old. But although I was persuaded not so much by the hope of supplying whatwas required, as by the shame of refusing, yet, as the matter opened itselfbefore me, I undertook of my own accord a much greater task than had beenimposed; that while I should thus oblige my very good friends by a fullercompliance, I might not enter a common path and tread only in the footsteps ofothers. For most other writers who have treated of the art of speaking, haveproceeded in such a manner as if upon adepts in every other kind of doctrinethey would lay the last touch in eloquence; either despising as little thingsthe studies which we first learn, or thinking them not to fall to their sharein the division which should be made of the professions; or, what indeed isnext to this, hoping no praise or thanks for their ingenuity about thingswhich, although necessary, lie far from ostentation: the tops of buildings makea show, their foundations are unseen.»--_Quintiliani de Inst. Orat.,Prooemium._
But the readermay ask, «What have all these things to do with English Grammar?» Ianswer, they help to show us whence and what it is. Some acquaintance with thehistory of grammar as a science, as well as some knowledge of the structure ofother languages than our own, is necessary to him who professes to write forthe advancement of this branch of learning--and for him also who would be acompetent judge of what is thus professed. Grammar must not forget her origin.Criticism must not resign the protection of letters. The national literature ofa country is in the keeping, not of the people at large, but of authors andteachers. But a grammarian presumes to be a judge of authorship, and a teacherof teachers; and is it to the honour of England or America, that in bothcountries so many are countenanced in this assumption of place, who can read nolanguage but their mother tongue? English Grammar is not properly an indigenousproduction, either of this country or of Britain; because it is but a branch ofthe general science of philology-- a new variety, or species, sprung up fromthe old stock long ago transplanted from the soil of Greece and Rome.
It is true,indeed, that neither any ancient system of grammatical instruction nor anygrammar of an other language, however contrived, can be entirely applicable tothe present state of our tongue; for languages must needs differ greatly onefrom an other, and even that which is called the same, may come in time todiffer greatly from what it once was. But the general analogies of speech,which are the central principles of grammar, are but imperfectly seen by theman of one language. On the other hand, it is possible to know much of thosegeneral principles, and yet be very deficient in what is peculiar to our owntongue. Real improvement in the grammar of our language, must result from aview that is neither partial nor superficial. «Time, sorry artist,»as was said of old, «makes all he handles worse.» And Lord Bacon,seeming to have this adage in view, suggests: «If Time of course alter allthings to the worse, and Wisdom and Counsel shall not alter them to the better,what shall be the end?»--_Bacon's Essays_, p. 64.

Conclusion
Hence the needthat an able and discreet grammarian should now and then appear, who withskillful hand can effect those corrections which a change of fashion or theignorance of authors may have made necessary; but if he is properly qualifiedfor his task, he will do all this without a departure from any of the greatprinciples of Universal Grammar. He will surely be very far from thinking, witha certain modern author, whom I shall notice in an other chapter, that,«He is bound to take words and explain them as he finds them in his day, withoutany regard to their ancient construction and application.»--_Kirkham'sGram._, p. 28. The whole history of every word, so far as he can ascertain it,will be the view under which he will judge of what is right or wrong in thelanguage which he teaches. Etymology is neither the whole of this view, nor yetto be excluded from it. I concur not therefore with Dr. Campbell, who, to makeout a strong case, extravagantly says, «It is never from an attentionto etymology, which would frequently mislead us, but from custom, the
only infallible guide in thismatter, that the meanings of words in present use must belearnt.»--Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 188. Jamieson too, with animplicitness little to be commended, takes this passage from Campbell; and,with no other change than that of "_learnt_" to "_learned_"publishes it as a corollary of his own.--Grammar of Rhetoric, p. 42. Itis folly to state for truth what is so obviously wrong. Etymology and customare seldom at odds; and where they are so, the latter can hardly be deemedinfallible.
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