Abelard on Universals
ByAlexander Koudlai
In this essay I shall attempt to show that in the XIIcentury there was a problem of relation of names to things and classes ofthings, or the problem of Universals. I shall also argue that Peter Abelard inhis examination of the problem was neither a nominalist (contrary to J. R.Weinberg’s claim in his Short History of Medieval Philosophy, p.79), noa realist in the full meaning of the terms, but rather synthesized bothpositions showing the limitations of each of them, and presented his solutionnamed conceptualism. I shall try to support my own impression that (contrary tothe opinion expressed by D.E.L. in the Britanica I, p. 26) he was not exactly aperipatetic but also was influenced by Plato and in that was also inclined to asynthesis with qualifications. And finally I shall go in some more details ofthe paradox of why some scholars like Weinberg called Abelard’s solutionnominalistic.
I
It is not just Weinberg who call’s Abelard’s solution a nominalistic.Professor A. Broadie also thinks that “in the dispute about the nature of theuniversals Abelard was in the nominalistic camp” (The Oxford Companion toPhilosophy, p. 1). For this reason, arguing against this, I would emphasizethat: 1. Abelard was well known as a knight in his debates. He was born ason of a knight in Brittany (a relative of the Duke), and this heredity showedin the manner of his philosophic and theological studies and confrontationswith his professors, 2. He studied philosophy mostly under two very differentspecialists: Roscelin of Compiegne (a nominalist) and Guillaume deChampeaux (a realist), and disagreed with each of them ratheraggressively. Peter was always a very independent and original thinker andinterlocutor. He always looked for a more inclusive and logically superiorsolution than those immediately available. I understand that this biographicalinformation does not present a demonstrative proof, but rather a background withwhich Weinberg’s and Broadie’s pictures just do not blend well, and upon whichI would try to draw a picture more plausible, i.e., that there was a thirdposition between realistic and nominalistic, namely, conceptualism,which could be defined as a synthesis of realism (thesis) and nominalism(antithesis), and which was precisely what Peter Abelard attempted toestablish.
II
It was the claim of extreme nominalists that the nameswere just sounds, that we could call one and the same thing quite oppositenames, and it would not change anything in its essence. It very well can be so,but in the naming things we also do something to ourselves, to our understandingof the physical nature of the things. Is there really man or woman,masterpiece, junk, good guy, bad guy, traitor, falsifier, guilty, innocent?Or all those words are just “utterances”? Is there some reality behindthe word mother, or John can be your mother if the court rules so?Abelard understood that there is some medium between things andnames which is not the name and not the thing it signifies, and still to keep thelanguage meaningful we must use certain words which point to thatmedium in order to form meaningful concepts in our minds. Without this physicswould not be possible as well as any science and language itself. That isbecause of that medium it is possible to translate from one language toanother. Without this there would be no dictionaries, and to understand Greekor Latin would be impossible. If you call a nominalist a genius, he willbe pleased, and if you call him a fool he will likely to get offended.But why, if it is true what he is teaching? Words do signify something aboutphysical world! The words we use to describe physical objects are symbols ofmeaningful concepts which we form about those things in our minds. They aremental in nature, but they necessarily belong to those particulars. ForAbelard this was easy to see and demonstrate. But what about the names which donot point to particulars? There were three questions, which Peter Abelard andPorphyry before him asked: (1) whether genera and species subsist or are placedonly in understanding; (2) if they subsist, whether they are corporeal orincorporeal; (3) whether they are separated from sensibles or are placed insensibles. Also there was the forth question added by Abelard, whether generaand species must refer to something or whether, if their normal referents aredestroyed, these universals could consist of mere meaning of the concept.
III
The next quotation from Abelard will shed more light onthe nature of the problem of how to understand universals, because therewere different opinions about that, and also expose Abelard’s perception ofPlato-Aristotle controversy and whether it was really a controversy:
Boethius likewise [Porphyry], when he says that the thoughtcollected from the likeness of many things is genus or species*, seems tohave understood the same common conception. Some insist that Plato wasof this opinion too, namely that he called those common ideas which heplaces in nous, genera and species. Boethius records that hedissented from Aristotle when he says that Plato wanted genera and speciesand the others not only to be understood universals, but also to be and tosubsist without bodies, as if to say that he understood as universals thosecommon conceptions which he set up separated from bodies in nous, notperhaps taking the universal as the common predication, as Aristotledoes, but rather as common likeness of many things. For that latterconception seems in no wise to be predicated of many as a noun is which isadapted singly to many.
That he says Plato thinks universals subsist withoutsensibles, can be resolved in another manner so that there is nodisagreement in the opinions of the philosophers. For what Aristotlesays to the effect that universals always subsist in sensibles, he said only inregard to actuality, because obviously the nature which is animal which isdesignated by universal name and which according to this is called universal bya certain transference, is never found in actuality except in a sensible thing,but Plato thinks that it so subsists in itself naturally that itwould retain its being when not subjected to sense, and according to this thenatural being is called by the universal name. That, consequently, whichAristotle denies with respect to actuality, Plato, the investigator ofphysics, assigns to natural aptitude, and thus there is no disagreementbetween them (H&W,183).
It likely follows from this that Abelard (in his searchof the proper definition for universals and examining the opinions of Porphyry,Boethius, and more importantly Aristotle and Plato) is trying to see thepossibility of truth in each position, if it is presented in accordance to themeaning of each philosopher — truth does not contradict truth. But evenso, he investigates the problem further reviewing a more recent (nominalistic)position, which he modifies, because by itself it does not lookreasonable enough to him:
Moreover, now that authorities have been advanced who seem tobuild up by universal words common concepts which are to be called forms, reasontoo seems to assent. For what else is it to conceive forms by nouns than tosignify by nouns? But certainly since we make forms diverse from understanding,there arises now besides thing and understanding a third thing which is thesignification of nouns. Although authority does not hold this, it isnevertheless not contrary to reason.
Let us then set forth what we promised above to define,namely, whatever the community of universal words is considered to be becauseof a common cause of imposition or because of a common conception or becauseof both. There is nothing to prevent that it be because of both, but thecommon cause which is taken in accordance of nature of things seems to havegreater force (183).
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*It feels that I have to apologize to the reader formy underlining of certain words and phrases. It may be useless and disturbingfor him providing that his knowledge of Abelard is flawless, but it isimportant for the clarity of my own understanding of the text, and also canhelp the reader to understand what particularly is important to me. (A. K. )
The nature ofthings, and not the words only, is something thathas to be of greater
importance for Abelard in definition of universals. If weconcentrate on this we could call him rather a realist. But let us wait a bit withthat. Looking at how we form the conceptions of universals, Abelard likes thenotion of abstraction, and this abstraction for him is not a nominalistic one:
Likewise we must define… thattheconceptions ofuniversals are formed by abstraction, and we must indicate how we mayspeak of them alone, naked and pure but not empty (183).
Here I would like to remind the reader the Aristotelian doctrine ofintellect-matter. According to it, there are two types of intellect: potentialand active; we have knowledge of something when we abstract the portion of thatpotentiality by active intellect: the matter is the principle of potentiality(unknown). Let us see now how Abelard deals with abstraction:
In relation to abstraction it must be known that matter and formalways subsist mixed together, but the reason of the mind has this power, thatit may now consider matter by itself; it may now turn its attention to formalone; it may now conceive both intermingled. The two first processes, ofcourse, are by abstraction; they abstract something from things conjoined thatthey may consider its very nature. But the third process is by conjunction.For example, the substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and investedin infinite forms; when I turn my attention to this in the materialessence of the substance, after having circumscribed all forms, I have aconcept by a process of abstraction. Again when I consider only corporeity init, which I join to substance, that concept likewise (although it is byconjunction with respect to the first, which considered only the nature ofsubstance) is formed also by abstraction with respect to other forms thancorporeity, none of which I consider, such as animation, sensuality, rationality,whiteness.
Conceptions of this sort through abstraction seemed perhapsfalse and vain for this reason, that they perceive the thing otherwise than itsubsists. For since they are concerned with matter by itself or formseparately, and since none the less neither of these subsists separately, theyseem obviously to conceive the thing otherwise than it is, and therefore to beempty. But this is not so (184).
Abstraction in any case is not empty for Abelard because itconsiders “the qualities the nature has” even though it does “notconsider all that it has“. When he considers “only this one among thequalities the nature has the only refers to the attentionalone, not to the mode of subsisting”. This process on one hand couldbe understood to be arbitrary (because we could choose where to pointour attention), but on the other hand it is restricted by the nature ofthings necessarily, and in the second sense is realistic. “Otherwise itwould not be reason, but opinion, that is if the understanding should deviatefrom the state of the thing”( 184). So, the concept formed in the mind byabstraction is a realistic one. But it is always limited always consideringonly part of the nature of the thing.
There is room to think that the abstraction is not theonly way how we get the realistic concepts of the world of physics. Abelard isa monk and a theologian, and not just a natural philosopher. He definitelybelieves in God, Supreme Intellect and Providence, miracles and prophets. Howis it possible to have knowledge of things before they actually exist? It isnot by way of abstraction. The ideas of things and their relations should beable to exist before the very things exist, otherwise prophecies would not bepossible. In his writings on universals Abelard does not go too far toinvestigate this, but there are passages, suggesting that the problem enteredhis mind in a peculiar form:
But the following question arises concerning the providence ofthe artist, whether it is empty when he holds in mind the form of a work stillfuture, seeing that the thing is not yet constituted so. But if we grant that,we are forced to say that likewise the providence of God is empty, which he hadbefore the creation of his work… Consequently, modifying the words weshould say that the providence is not empty…(185)
Abelard promises: “There will be a fuller investigation of this inrelation to the on Interpretation”, but he also says: “any questionconcerning the understanding with respect to God is superfluous”, and in theregular case of our knowledge he returns “to the conception of universalswhich must always be formed by abstraction” (185). But what is the nature ofthis abstraction compare to the abstraction of the concept of things?
When I hearman orwhiteness orwhite Ido not recall from the meaning of the noun allthe natures orproperties which are in the subject things, but from man I have onlythe conception although confused, not discrete, of animal and rationalmortal, but not of the later accidents as well. For the conceptions ofindividuals, too, are formed by abstraction, when namely it is said: thissubstance, this body, this animal, this man, this whiteness, this white. For bythis man I consider only the nature of man but related to a certainsubject, whereas by man I consider that same nature simply in itselfnot related to anyone. Wherefore the understanding of universals isrightly spoken of as alone and naked and pure, that is, alonein regard to the senses, because it does not perceive the thing as sensual,and naked in regard to the abstraction of all and any forms, and purewith respect to discreteness because no thing whether it be matteror form, is designated in it; in this latter respect we called aconception of this sort confused above (186).
So, according to Abelard, we should understand universals as neitherthings no merely words, also he does not grant them the status of forms (whichmakes his position neither realistic no nominalistic!). They constitute aspecial class of confused but real concepts, which are also useful in ourthinking of the natural world and our intellect as well.
IV
After having shown the nature of the universals Abelardproceeds to the resolution of the questions concerning genera and species:
The first question, then, was to this effect, whethergenera and species subsist, that is signify something truly existent, or areplaced in understanding alone, etc., that is, are located in empty opinionwithout the thing, like the following words, chimera and goat-stag which do notgive rise to a rational understanding.
To this it must be replied that in truth they signify bynomination things truly existent, to wit, the same things assingular nouns, and in no wise are they located in empty opinion; nevertheless,they consist in a certain sense in the understanding alone and nakedand pure, as has been determined.
(2) …whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal,that is when they are considered to signify subsistences whether they signifysubsistences which are corporeal or incorporeal… I see that the existingthings some are called corporeal and others incorporeal, which of these shallwe say are the things signified by universals? To which the reply is made: in acertain sense corporeal things, that is things discrete in their essence andincorporeal with respect to the designation of the universal noun becauseobviously universals do not name discretely and determinately, but confusedly,as we have set forth sufficiently above. Whence the universal namesthemselves are called both corporeal with respect to the nature of thingsand incorporeal with respect to the manner of signification, because althoughthey name things which are discrete, nevertheless they do not name themdiscretely and determinately.
(3) …whether they are placed in sensibles, etc., follows fromgranting that they are incorporeal, because obviously the incorporeal takenin a certain manner is divided by being and by not being in the sensible.… And universals are said to subsist in sensibles, that is to signifythe intrinsic substance existing in a thing which is sensible by itsexterior forms, and although they signify this substance whichsubsists actually in the sensible thing, yet they demonstrate the samesubstance naturally separated from the sensible thing, as we determined abovein relation to Plato. Wherefore Boethius says that genera and species areunderstood, but are not, outside sensible things, in thatobviously the things of genera and species are considered with respect to theirnature rationally in themselves even when the exterior forms by which theycome to the senses have been removed… obviously they do not designatethe sensible things which they name in the same manner as they are perceived,that is as discrete, and sense does not discover them by demonstration of them,it remained a question whether universals named sensible things only or whetherthey also signified something else; to which it is replied that they signifyboth sensible things and at the same time that common conceptionwhich Priscian ascribes particularly to the divine mind.
And in accord with them. With respect to that which weunderstand here as the fourth question, as we noted above, thefollowing is the solution, that we in no wise hold that universal nouns are,when, their things having been destroyed, they are not predicable of manythings inasmuch as they are not common to any things, as for example thename of the rose when there are no longer roses, but it would still,nevertheless, be significative by the understanding, although it wouldlack nomination; otherwise there would not be the proposition: there is norose (187).
Here we can note that Abelard’s answers are extremely sharp,flexible and inclusive. He concentrates on the different meanings in which theuniversals are applied and understood. He always keeps in mind the physicalreality they refer to. He also states that they could be significative evenwithout nomination. And this is, in my opinion, a very strong claim (amongothers mentioned above) against those who would like to call his solution anominalistic one. Names, and universal names particularly, are not just mere“utterances”, because they signify being and not being of something inthe physical world.
It must be noted, however, that although the definition of theuniversal or of the genus or the species includes only words, neverthelessthese nouns are often transferred to their things, as when it is said thatspecies is made up of genus and difference, that is, the thing of the speciesfrom the thing of the genus. For when the nature of words is examined withrespect of signification,it is a question sometimes of words and sometimesof things, and frequently the names of the latter and the former aretransferred reciprocally (188).
It can be seen now that it is neither nominalism no realism, becausethe words sometimes signify words and sometimes things. In his rather realisticinclination Abelard, who does not like to talk nonsense as well as to hear one,warns us:
For this reason most of all, the ambiguous treatment of logic aswell as grammar leads many, who do not distinguish clearly and properly of theimposition of nouns or the abuse of transference, into error by thetransference of nouns (188).
He wants us always to make sense or signify either things or wordsand understand what is that we are doing at the moment.
Now, I think, it is clear that there was a problem ofuniversals at the time, otherwise there would be no alternative questions andattempted solutions about them. It seems that Abelard’s solution was neithernominalistic, no realistic. He tried to give life of a meaningful concept tothe universals, saying thatthey signify by nomination things truly existent,and some say he succeeded for another 300 years in his conceptualism. There isa reason why Abelard was not a peripatetic (meaning the follower of Aristotle).He could not, being a Christian theologian and the observer of Plato,considering his position with qualification (together with Boethius), but likealmost every medieval thinker he was indebted to The Philosopher, which did notprevent him from being a very original thinker with rather synthetictendencies.
V
What consequences of Abelard’s writings on universalscould be thought of? The doctrine that names for physical things and for theirgroups of certain kind, like genera and species, and universals in general, atleast some times are real, i.e., constitute a valid knowledge about thephysical world as well as at other times the knowledge about the operations ofour mind, influenced the further development of natural philosophy and logic inWestern tradition. The subtle and multiple-level solution of the problemencouraged a more elaborated and keen approach to the other problems ofphilosophy as well. The philosophers, like for instance Tomas Aquinas, weregreatly impressed by Peter Abelard’s work and they used his solution in theirwritings. I believe that later even Immanuel Kant was indebted to Abelardbuilding his arguments about necessity intrinsic to science, which was, in myopinion, the strongest part in proving his TranscendentalAesthetic, namely how are synthetic a priori propositions possible.We can trace Abelard’s logical ideas in Kant’s writings on logic.
Who knows how much F. Bacon was in his debt, when heso passionately believed in the new method for acquiring knowledge of thephysical world? It is easy to underestimate Abelard’s importance for the wholedevelopment of Western science, if we fail to consider that his doctrine wasnot a nominalistic one, which I hope I was able to demonstrate in this essay.
VI
There still remains a question: Why some scholars like Weinberg and Broadie called Abelard’s solutionnominalistic? In order to answer this, let us first look at their definitionsof the term nominalism and then on some of their explanation of whatAbelard wrote on the universals.
Nominalism traditionally understood is a doctrine,which denies the real existence of universals, conceived as supposed referentsof general terms like “red” or “table”… In more recent usage,‘nominalism’ is often employed as a label for any repudiation of abstractentities, whether universals or particulars…(O.C.P., p.624)
In contrast to that, TheOxford Companion to Philosophy gives us thefollowing on the term realism:
‘Real’ is often used with some opposite term inmind, such as ‘ideal’ or ‘fake’. To assert thatsomething is somehow mind-independent is to move in the realist direction… (647)
Abelard thinks that nouns can be real andfake, or empty. When we speak of genera and species “they signify by nomination things truly existent, to wit, the same things as singular nouns, and in nowise are they located in empty opinion”, when we speak of mere words andimages “like the following words, chimera and goat-stag which do not give riseto a rational understanding” those are located in empty opinion without thething.
So, if somebody would focus exclusively on the secondkind of words in Abelard’s solution, it would seem to him that Peter is anominalist. Which I believe is the case with Weinberg and Broadie. It ispossible then to form the concept of universal fakes like unicorns, centaurs…and call them empty species. It would be fine if Abelard did not also emphasizethe first kind of words, which in no wise are located in empty opinion.If we focus exclusively on this kind of words we could (with the same right!)call Abelard a realist, and his solution of the problem of the universal arealistic one. But the truth is that there are two and not only one type ofwords Abelard shows, that is why his solution must be called rathersynthetic, and the word is conceptualism. Abelard learned from bothof his teachers and not just from one of them, and he was a very attentivestudent!
J. Weinberg and A. Broadie: some account ofthe arguments they give for their claim.
Broadie says:“In the dispute about the nature of the universals he [Abelard] was in thenominalist camp, holding that universals are utterances (voces) ormental terms, not things in the real world”.
This is far from precision, as I already showedgiving a much more inclusive Abelard’s quotations about universals. Once more,Abelard’s universals are mental terms (like all terms), but they are sometimesabout real things in the real world.
Broadie: “The universality of theuniversal derives from the fact that it is predicable of many things.Nevertheless, unless a number of things are in the same state, the oneuniversal term cannot be predicated of them”.
Let’s read it as: unless many thingsare in the same state…we cannot call them by the name signifying that state. Itis applicable, for instance, to the state of existing, and Abelard is saying:“we in no wise hold that universal nouns are, when,their things having been destroyed, they are not predicable of many thingsinasmuch as they are not common to any things, asfor example the name of the rose when there are no longer roses, but itwould still, nevertheless, be significative by the understanding, althoughit would lack nomination; otherwise there would not be the proposition:there is no rose”. Here the physical roses do not exist but the meaningfulconcept of roses, the universal, does, but in the mind only. This is only oneof the cases of universals, and even in this case the name roses is notempty. It is not exactly the same to say there is no rose in the vase asthere is no unicorn in the room. Because we observe real roses in othertimes and places in the physical world, but nobody really observes unicorns inreality. Abelard shows the possibility to talk about real things, and thenuniversals describing them have certain reality, he also shows thepossibility to predicate unreal things only existing in the mind, in that casethey will certainly not have real existence. Still, in both cases they willhave the existence as mental concepts. So some concepts could signify realthings of physics and others could exist without physical referents. Itis just when we talk about the second type of Abelard’s names we could considerhim “in the nominalist camp”. But how in the worldcould we do that considering his other types?
J. Weinberg says: “His [Abelard’s] nominalistic solution ofthe problem of universals requires him to deny that universals are things andto affirm that they are significant words or concepts merely, and he finds aproblem in the existence of a significant term which has no normalextradiscursive referent” (79). I can answer that the terms merely and significantpresent a contradiction. If a word is merely a word it is empty. If theword signifies something it has certain physical reality, and not merely aword. Therefore the above attempt to identify Abelard’s solution, in myopinion, lacks discretion and presents a logical problem. About the normal referentI can say that Abelard shows different cases (which I already exposed above) inwhich there sometimes are physical referents and at other times there areno physical referents. Hence, it is better to say thatAbelard’s solution is neither nominalistic no realistic but rather syntheticwith qualifications, which I already did in this essay.
But what if the following questionsstill come to our mind?
1. How is it that Broadie (and others) et alstill adopt that reading? 2. Are they just being silly, or
3. are they stressing other texts, or are theynot convinced that my reading of Abelard’s texts is correct?
Personally, I respect scholarship ingeneral, and first would consult specialists on any topic of their expertiseand only then would try my own reasoning wanting it to be informed andinclusive. However, the problem with so-called specialists often arises: notall philosophers concentrate on certain problematic phenomena, and, having hadfocusing on particular areas of the history of thought and doing a really goodjob there, sometimes they treat other areas without proper discretion. If itwere not so, we would not have to think for ourselves at all but just tomemorize what some specialist have said. We would not even have to read theoriginals. It is after reading the Abelard’s original writings with particularinterest and sympathy I was surprised to read those statements ofBroadie and Weinberg, which seemed to me contradicting my understanding ofAbelard. I have to say that it is not that everything they wrote onAbelard was not helpful, on the contrary, I liked reading them, especiallyWeinberg.
Now, about the questions themselves.It seems to me that there isa temptation (1) to callAbelard a nominalist, because nominalism is one of the foundationsof his solution. As I already said, probably those writers thought it was goodenough to use the term for this reason. We also often call the snow white whenit is white only partially, like today. I do not know if we should be called silly for this (2),but I do think that the snow right after the snow-storm would be called whitemore properly then today. And compare to that the latter should be moreproperly called dirty-white or something like that. About other textsWeinberg stresses, I just went through those again (in S.H.M.P.) with thisparticular question in mind, noticed the exposition of Abelard’s criticalattitude to both, realistic Guillaume de Champeaux and nominalistic Roscelin of Compiegne, (and alsoothers), nevertheless I could not find any relative argument which couldpresent a contradiction to my reading of Abelard on this matter. There could beappearances of justification of that claim but I just can’t see anything reallystrong. That is why I will show only a couple of examples:
“The universal is that which innaturally apt to be predicated of many” (p.82). This rather supports therealistic element of the Abelard’s doctrine. If, what ever it is, auniversal is naturally apt to be predicated of particulars, it hascertain physical reality and cannot be empty. But then the critique of acertain doctrine follows, and Abelard, finds a flaw in that particular doctrineof collection of particulars. This critique still is not directedagainst the realism of universal itself but against the notion of universal asa collection-term for the particulars, which does not support the Weinberg’sclaim we are investigating.
What than about the following?
“While the motivation of this theory (Adelard ofBath’s) is clearly the attempt to locate universality in individual things, itfails in the attempt to predicate a thing of a thing” (p. 83).
This also criticizes not a reality of a universal in general, butrather a particular doctrine designed for such purpose. And so in allother cases shown by Weinberg, as far as I can judge. So, after anotherexamination of the texts, I cannot see anything to compromise my position. I do not think that they are stressing other texts (3), relativeto the essence of my claim. About whether they are convinced that my readingof Abelard’s texts is correct, I cannot actually say unless I ask Weinbergand Broadie and they choose to respond to my critique.
Still, if the reader can see something I keep missing, I would beobliged if he brought it to my attention, and until then I remain satisfied withmy conclusion which consists of the following:
The Abelards solution of the problem of universals is neither arealistic no a nominalistic one, or, in other words, it is in the same degreenominalistic as it is realistic; it includes elements of both as well as acritique of both taken separately in their application to the totality of thequestion. Neither one by itself can deal with all cases Abelard has exposed,because it is the meaning of the words in their relationship with the classesof particulars which determines their real or only nominal usage appropriate ineach case, and that is determined sometimes by the mind only and sometimes bythe nature of those particulars as well. The proper usage of logic hererequires great attention and care in the construction of a meaningful concept.That is why it is better to call Abelard’s solution conceptualism, and the wordhere signifies a combination or synthesis of realism and nominalism.
BibliographyHyman and Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1973. J. R. Weinberg, Short History of Medieval Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1991. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by T. Honderich, Oxford University Press, 1995. Britannica,v. I, Chicago 1997.